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Shortly after its adoption, Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (‘Common Article 
3’) was described as ‘striking’ and ‘revolutionary’, as well as a ‘legal heresy’ and ‘unconceivable, 
from a legal point of view’. 70 years after its adoption and coming into force, I seek to explore 
what type of a ‘revolution’ or ‘heresy’ Common Article 3 represented. I argue that Common Article 
3 was not revolutionary or heretical merely because it applied international law to civil war and 
revolution or imposed international obligations on rebels. The law of alien protection and the 
doctrine of belligerency already did this. It was certainly the first multilateral treaty to do so, but 
such a change in form is not, I argue, revolutionary or heretical in itself. What was groundbreaking 
about Common Article 3 was that it applied international law to civil war and revolution and 
imposed international obligations on rebels within a new framing of internal conflict as a 
humanitarian — rather than a primarily commercial — problem. It took many decades, however, 
and the rise of international human rights law, for this framing to come to predominate and for 
international lawyers to take a serious interest in the obligations of rebels. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after its adoption, Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
(‘Common Article 3’)1 was described as ‘striking’2 and ‘revolutionary’,3 as well 
as a ‘legal heresy’4 and ‘unconceivable, from a legal point of view’.5 Common 
Article 3 provides that in an ‘armed conflict not of an international character’, 
‘each Party to the conflict’ is bound by a set of minimum standards for the humane 
treatment of ‘[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities’.6 It also provides for 
the collection and care of the wounded and sick, and the provision of services ‘to 
the Parties to the conflict’ by ‘[a]n impartial humanitarian body, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross’.7 Finally, Common Article 3 stipulates 
that the ‘Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention’ and that ‘[t]he application of the preceding provisions shall not affect 
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict’.8 What was so striking about this? In 
1950, the International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’), in its preliminary 
analysis of the Geneva Conventions, explained: 
[Common Article 3] does no less than extend the Conventions to civil war, and, in 
general, to all conflicts which cannot be classed as international war … Till very 
recently, the idea of extending the Conventions to cover a domestic conflict was 
thought to be impossible from a legal point of view … Much blood had to be shed 
in another World War and great changes made in the conceptions of International 
Law, before this idea could even begin to be accepted by Governments. Once the 
idea was more or less agreed to, powerful obstacles had still to be overcome before 
it could be reduced to an acceptable formula.9 
Among the ‘principal difficulties’ identified by the ICRC was the 
‘impossibility, from a legal point of view’, of binding ‘illegal rebel group[s]’ to 
 
 1 See, eg, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered 
into force 21 October 1950) art 3 (‘Geneva Convention I’); Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 
1950) art 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for 
signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) art 3; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for 
signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) art 3.  
 2 International Committee of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949: 
Analysis for the Use of National Red Cross Societies (1950) vol 2, 5 (‘Geneva Conventions 
Analysis’). 
 3 Frédéric Siordet, ‘The Geneva Conventions and Civil War’ (1950) 3(8) Revue Internationale 
de la Croix-Rouge et Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge: Supplement 132, 
133.  
 4 Frédéric Siordet, ‘The Geneva Conventions and Civil War (Continued)’ (1950) 3(9) Revue 
Internationale de la Croix-Rouge et Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge: 
Supplement 166, 168.  
 5 Frédéric Siordet, ‘The Geneva Conventions and Civil War (Concluded)’ (1950) 3(11) Revue 
Internationale de la Croix-Rouge et Bulletin International des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge: 
Supplement 201, 212.  
 6 Geneva Convention I (n 1) art 3.  
 7 Ibid. 
 8 Ibid. 
 9 Geneva Conventions Analysis (n 2) vol 2, 5–6.  
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the Conventions as non-states and non-signatories.10 Noting that such ‘misgivings 
… were not without foundation’, the ICRC concluded that it was ‘remarkable that 
the Geneva Conference was able to agree upon a text’.11 
Following the 70th anniversary of its adoption and coming into force, I seek to 
explore what type of a ‘revolution’ or ‘heresy’ Common Article 3 represented in 
terms of the international regulation of revolution and civil war and, in particular, 
the imposition of obligations on rebel and insurgent groups. Some have argued 
that Common Article 3 was the first time that international law addressed civil war 
at all.12 In fact, prior to 1949, there was a significant body of international law 
relevant to civil war and revolution.13 There was, most directly, the doctrine of 
belligerency, which, among other things, imposed obligations on and gave rights 
to rebel groups via recognition.14 The law of alien protection also applied certain 
standards to civil war and revolution.15 Although it did apply in other 
circumstances and is not commonly thought of as being of any particular relevance 
to domestic conflict, in fact, revolution and civil war were the paradigm of alien 
protection.16 Thus, as Richard Falk has argued, ‘[t]he phenomenon of civil war, 
despite the terminology, is not, and has never been, an entirely domestic affair’.17 
In fact, it was Common Article 3 that established — rather than overcame — the 
distinction between international and non-international conflict, a distinction that 
was consolidated by the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions 
(‘Additional Protocols’),18 in which the internationalisation of certain conflicts 
only deepened the marginalisation of others. It was through the subsequent 
practice of first NGOs and then international organisations, particularly in the area 
of human rights, that this marginalisation was later overcome. 
So, what was new — other than its form as a multilateral treaty — about 
Common Article 3? I will argue that Common Article 3, with its protections for 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities without discrimination and its 
provision for humanitarian relief, marked the beginning of a shift towards a new 
framing of civil war and revolution as primarily a humanitarian problem rather 
than predominantly a problem for relations, and particularly commercial relations, 
 
 10 Ibid vol 2, 6.  
 11 Ibid vol 2, 7.  
 12 See, eg, Michael Bothe, ‘Article 3 and Protocol II: Case Studies of Nigeria and El Salvador’ 
(1982) 31(4) American University Law Review 899, 899.  
 13 For a comprehensive and insightful recent study, see Ville Kari, ‘On the Classical Doctrine 
of Civil War in International Law’ (PhD Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2020). 
 14 See, eg, Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 9–20. 
 15 See, eg, Kathryn Greenman, ‘Aliens in Latin America: Intervention, Arbitration and State 
Responsibility for Rebels’ (2018) 31(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 617 (‘Aliens in 
Latin America’). 
 16 Ibid 622–3. 
 17 Richard A Falk, ‘Introduction’ in Richard A Falk (ed), The International Law of Civil War 
(Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) 1, 1.  
 18 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (‘Additional Protocol I’); 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for 
signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (‘Additional 
Protocol II’).  
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between states. What was groundbreaking about Common Article 3 was that it 
applied international law to civil war and revolution and imposed international 
obligations on rebels within a new framing of internal conflict as a humanitarian 
— rather than a primarily commercial — problem. While the century preceding 
Common Article 3 has been characterised as representing ‘the rise of international 
law concern’ for non-international armed conflict,19 I will argue that international 
law has long been concerned about revolution and civil war, but it is the nature of 
this concern that has changed. 
In what follows, I will first look at how international law regulated civil war 
and revolution prior to 1949. I will then proceed to analyse the ways in which 
Common Article 3 did, and did not, change international law’s treatment of civil 
war and revolution: first in terms of the shift to humanitarianism, and then more 
specifically in terms of the obligations of rebel and insurgent groups. Before 
getting underway, it is worth saying something about terminology. Common 
Article 3 coined the term ‘armed conflict not of an international character’.20 This 
marked a shift from the language of rebellion, insurgency and civil war that had 
been used previously,21 although such terminology remained dominant until the 
1970s. The term ‘non-international armed conflict’ only slowly began to take over 
from the late 1970s onwards.22 Common Article 3 thus straddles this change in 
vocabulary. In this piece, I generally stick with the older language, even if 
Common Article 3 does not use it, for continuity and to reflect the recent 
resurgence of interest in revolution and civil war in international law.23 
II CIVIL WAR AND REVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PRE-1949 
Prior to 1949, there was a significant body of international law relevant to civil 
war and revolution, made up of the doctrine of belligerency and — perhaps less 
obviously — the law of alien protection.24 These were bodies of customary 
international law that developed and were applied in an ad hoc fashion. They 
framed civil war and revolution primarily as a problem for relations between 
states, particularly commercial relations. Humanitarian concerns were peripheral 
or even incidental to these regimes. These regimes regulated — to a certain extent 
— what states and rebels could and could not do during civil wars and revolutions, 
 
 19 See Laura Perna, The Formation of the Treaty Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 29 (emphasis added).  
 20 Geneva Convention I (n 1) art 3. 
 21 See Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (n 14) 9. 
 22 Following the adoption of this terminology by Additional Protocol II (n 18). 
 23 See Owen Taylor, International Law and Revolution (Routledge, 2019); Deborah Whitehall, 
‘The International Prospects of the Soixante-Huitard’ (2018) 29(4) European Journal of 
International Law 1377; David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (Alfred A Knopf, 
2017); Anne Orford, ‘Civil War, Intervention and the Transformation of International Law’ 
(International Order & Justice Public Lecture Series, Rolin-Jaequemyns International Law 
Institute, Ghent University, 12 December 2017); Vidya Kumar, ‘International Law, Kelsen 
and the Aberrant Revolution: Excavating the Politics and Practices of Revolutionary Legality 
in Rhodesia and Beyond’ in Nikolas M Rajkovic, Tanja E Aalberts and Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen (eds), The Power of Legality: Practices of International Law and Their Politics 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016) 157.  
 24 For early scholarship here, see Carlos Wiesse, Reglas de derecho internacional aplicables a 
las guerras civiles [International Law Rules Applicable to Civil Wars] (Viuda Galland, 1893); 
Antoine Rougier, Les guerres civiles et le droit des gens [Civil Wars and the Law of Nations] 
(Larose, 1903).  
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but not, for the most part, in the interests of humanitarianism. In this section, I seek 
to understand how they worked to mediate the impact of revolution and civil war 
on international economic order. 
A Alien Protection 
The law of alien protection concerned the rights of states to protect their 
nationals overseas and the duties of states when it came to the treatment of foreign 
citizens in their territory.25 This field of law emerged in the context of the 
expansion of capitalism during the 19th century, particularly in newly decolonised 
Latin America. This was acknowledged by the earliest scholars of alien protection 
at the beginning of the 20th century. United States international lawyer Edwin M 
Borchard described alien protection as a response to the frictions caused by the 
‘vast commercial and other interests abroad’ resulting from ‘increased facilities 
for travel and communication’ and ‘the growth of international commerce and 
intercourse’.26 For Frederick Sherwood Dunn, another US scholar of international 
law, the problem that alien protection was concerned with was  
maintaining a unified economic and social order for the conduct of international 
trade and intercourse among independent political units of diverse cultures and 
stages of civilization, different legal and economic systems, and varying degrees of 
physical power and prestige.27  
Dunn noted the ‘special importance’ of the decolonisation of Latin America to 
the development of alien protection;28 Latin American independence meant the 
‘opening up of the new world to international trade’29 (since previously Spain 
enforced a strict monopoly on trade with the region):30 ‘Here was a vast new 
territory, rich in the minerals and other resources needed in the economic life of 
Europe, and offering huge potential markets for European goods.’31 Yet there was 
a problem: ‘in large sections of the new world’, observed Dunn, ‘political disorder 
and revolutions prevailed for many years’.32 Alien protection thus mediated the 
extension of capitalist economic order, as embodied in international law, in the 
face of political instability.33 
 
 25 See Edwin M Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, or, The Law of 
International Claims (Banks Law Publishing, 1915); Frederick Sherwood Dunn, The 
Protection of Nationals: A Study in the Application of International Law (Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1932) (‘The Protection of Nationals’).  
 26 Borchard (n 25) v; Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (n 25) 53. Cf Julius Goebel Jr, ‘The 
International Responsibility of States for Injuries Sustained by Aliens on Account of Mob 
Violence, Insurrections and Civil Wars’ (1914) 8(4) American Journal of International Law 
802, 819, arguing that it was ‘an outgrowth of the whole movement for individual rights which 
culminated in the French Revolution’.  
 27 Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (n 25) 1.  
 28 Ibid 53. 
 29 Ibid. 
 30 See Graciela Márquez, ‘Commercial Monopolies and External Trade’ in Victor Bulmer-
Thomas, John H Coatsworth and Roberto Cortés Conde (eds), The Cambridge Economic 
History of Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2005–06) vol 1, 395. 
 31 Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (n 25) 53.  
 32 Ibid 54.  
 33 Ibid. For contemporary accounts here, see Rose Parfitt, The Process of International Legal 
Reproduction: Inequality, Historiography, Resistance (Cambridge University Press, 2019); 
Ntina Tzouvala, Capitalism as Civilisation: A History of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2020).  
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Although it applied more widely and did not, on its face, seem of special 
relevance to domestic conflict, revolution and civil war were in fact the central 
case of alien protection.34 While initially alien protection was exercised through 
diplomatic or military means, it emerged as an international legal field largely as 
a result of a series of arbitrations in the 19th and early 20th centuries.35 The most 
influential mixed claims commissions of this period were set up following 
revolutions or civil wars,36 such as in the US, Spain’s then colonies, Mexico, 
Venezuela and Chile,37 and particularly where such revolutions or civil wars 
disrupted periods of capitalist expansion, such as those in Venezuela under 
Antonio Guzmán Blanco and in Mexico under Porfirio Díaz.38 In addition to the 
protections for nationals provided for in bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce 
and navigation,39 these arbitral tribunals developed principles of customary 
 
 34 Some of the earliest scholarship on alien protection focused specifically on injuries caused 
during revolution and civil war: see, eg, Carlos Calvo, ‘De la non-responsabilité des états à 
raison des pertes et dommages éprouvés par des étrangers en temps de troubles intérieurs ou 
de guerres civiles’ [On the Non-Responsibility of States for Losses and Damages Experienced 
by Foreigners in Times of Internal Troubles or Civil Wars] (1869) (1st ser) 1 Revue de Droit 
International et de Législation Comparée 417; Luis A Podestá Costa, El extranjero en la 
guerra civil [The Foreigner in Civil War] (Coni Hermanos, 1913). The topic was chosen by 
the Institut de Droit International as a topic for codification in 1900 and was also later 
discussed by the International Law Association and the American Society of International 
Law at their meetings: see below n 40.  
 35 See Kathryn Greenman, ‘Aliens in Latin America’ (n 15); Frédéric Mégret, ‘Mixed Claim 
Commissions and the Once Centrality of the Protection of Aliens’ in Ignacio de la Rasilla and 
Jorge E Viñuales (eds), Experiments in International Adjudication: Historical Accounts 
(Cambridge University Press, 2019) 127; Tzvika Alan Nissel, ‘A History of State 
Responsibility: The Struggle for International Standards (1870–1960)’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of Helsinki, 2016) 78–9.  
 36 Nissel (n 35) 78–9; M Koskenniemi, ‘The Ideology of International Adjudication and the 
1907 Hague Conference’ in Yves Daudet (ed), Topicality of the 1907 Hague Conference, the 
Second Peace Conference (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 127, 149.  
 37 A Britain–US mixed claims commission was set up by the Treaty between Great Britain and 
the United States for the Amicable Settlement of All Causes of Difference between the Two 
Countries, 143 ConTS 145 (signed and entered into force 8 May 1871) (‘Treaty of 
Washington’) to deal with claims arising out of acts committed against persons or property 
during the US Civil War; Spain established mixed commissions with the US in 1871 to deal 
with injuries to US citizens during the insurrection in Cuba and with Britain in 1923 after 
uprisings in Morocco; commissions were set up between Chile and a number of states during 
the 1890s following the Chilean Civil War of 1891; 11 states established commissions with 
Venezuela following the revolutions and civil wars of 1892–1902; and a series of 
commissions were set up between Mexico and foreign states to resolve alien protection claims 
coming out of the Mexican Revolution of 1910–20: AM Stuyt, Survey of International 
Arbitrations: 1794–1938 (Springer, 1939) 95–6, 98, 182, 185, 190, 199, 245, 253, 266, 
268–76, 369–70, 372–5, 385, 389, 399, 402–3.  
 38 On the Venezuelan commissions, see Kathryn Greenman, ‘The History and Legacy of State 
Responsibility for Rebels 1839–1930: Protecting Trade and Investment against Revolution in 
the Decolonised World’ (PhD Thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2019) ch 2 (‘The History 
and Legacy of State Responsibility for Rebels’). On the Mexican commissions, see AH Feller, 
The Mexican Claims Commissions, 1923–1934: A Study in the Law and Procedure of 
International Tribunals (Macmillan, 1935) 7, 15; Frederick Sherwood Dunn, The Diplomatic 
Protection of Americans in Mexico (Columbia University Press, 1933).  
 39 See, eg, Borchard (n 25) 222; Richard B Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary 
International Law (Manchester University Press, 1984) 18–21.  
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international law. From the late 19th century onwards, scholars and institutions 
sought to codify or develop the rules in this area.40 
The law of alien protection secured for foreign nationals ‘a certain minimum of 
rights necessary to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property’, enforceable 
internationally should their domestic vindication fail, protecting aliens from ‘the 
arbitrary action of the state’.41 In the context of revolution and civil war, this meant 
that the state was obliged to compensate foreigners for injuries resulting from acts 
of its authorities and troops in the course of the conflict, such as plunder or seizure 
of property,42 other than ‘those [injuries] inflicted during actual hostilities’ and 
justified by military necessity.43 Acts of state authorities also included acts of 
successful rebels and national de facto governments, as well as certain acts of local 
de facto authorities.44 Most significantly, however, unless there was a recognition 
of belligerency, the state was obliged to exercise due diligence to protect 
foreigners against harm caused by rebels.45 
That its central concern was insulating economic order against revolution and 
civil war is not to say that there was not also a humanitarian aspect to alien 
 
 40 See, eg, E Brusa, ‘Responsabilité des états à raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers 
en cas d’émeute ou de guerre civile’ [Responsibility of States for Damage Suffered by 
Foreigners in the Event of Riot or Civil War] (1898) 17 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit 
International 96; L de Bar, ‘De la responsabilité des états à raison des dommages soufferts 
par des étrangers en cas de troubles, d’émeute ou de guerre civile’ [On the Responsibility of 
States for Damage Suffered by Foreigners in the Event of Unrest, Riot or Civil War] (1899) 
(2nd ser) 1 Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée 464; Institut de Droit 
International, Règlement sur la responsabilité des états à raison des dommages soufferts par 
des étrangers en cas d’émeute, d’insurrection ou de guerre civile [Regulation on the 
Responsibility of States for Damage Suffered by Foreigners in the Event of Riot, Insurgency 
or Civil War] (Resolution, Session de Neuchâtel, 10 September 1900); Convention 
concerning the Rights of Aliens, 190 ConTS 445 (signed and entered into force 29 January 
1902); LA Podestá Costa, ‘International Responsibility of the State for Damages Suffered by 
Aliens During Civil War’ (1922) 31(1) International Law Association Reports of Conferences 
119; Charles Strupp, ‘Responsabilité internationale de l’état en cas de dommages, causes aux 
ressortissants d’un état étranger en cas de troubles, d’émeutes, ou de guerres civiles’ 
[International Responsibility of the State in the Event of Troubles, Riots or Civil Wars] (1922) 
31(1) International Law Association Reports of Conferences 127; Committee of Experts for 
the Progressive Codification of International Law, League of Nations, ‘Questionnaire No 4 
Adopted by the Committee at its Second Session, held in January 1926: Responsibility of 
States for Damage Done in Their Territories to the Person or Property of Foreigners’ (1926) 
20(Special) Supplement to the American Journal of International Law 176; James W Garner, 
‘Responsibility of States for Injuries Suffered by Foreigners within Their Territories on 
Account of Mob Violence, Riots and Insurrection’ (1927) 21 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 49; Institute of International Law, ‘International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries on Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners’ 
(1928) 22(Special) Supplement to the American Journal of International Law 330; 
Supplement, ‘Draft Conventions and Comments on Nationality, Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens, and Territorial Waters, Prepared by the Research in International Law of 
the Harvard Law School’ (1929) 23(Special) Supplement to the American Journal of 
International Law 1.  
 41 Borchard (n 25) 39.  
 42 Ibid 233–5. 
 43 Ibid 233.  
 44 Ibid 206–9, 239–42: the legitimate government could not collect for a second time taxes or 
customs paid to local de facto authorities.  
 45 Ibid 235–6.  
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protection. It did capture cases of murder, torture and deprivation of liberty.46 
However, this was secondary to the commercial interests that were at the core of 
alien protection. The first mixed claims commissions enforced claims for ‘injuries 
to persons or property by the authorities of the state’,47 a jurisdiction that came to 
be understood as including claims based in contract.48 Contract claims, as 
Borchard noted, ‘[c]oincident with the constant growth of international intercourse 
and the exploitation of backward countries by foreign capital … assumed large 
proportions’.49 Property claims were, however, often the most significant 
category. They were the most numerous before, for example, the 1839 Mexico–US 
commission and the 1923 Mexico–US general commission.50 Following the 
1902–03 blockade, Venezuela was forced to admit liability for property claims 
before the mixed claims commissions that were set up with the blockading 
powers.51 Furthermore, companies and corporations were as important a category 
of claimants as individuals.52 Ultimately, foreigners were protected primarily as 
commercial actors, rather than individuals. 
In sum, the law of alien protection regulated states’ conduct in respect of civil 
war and revolution, at least to the extent that such conduct impacted on certain 
internationally protected rights of foreign nationals. There were no obligations on 
rebels — their conduct was only regulated indirectly through the state. Of course, 
this is more limited than the scope of Common Article 3, which does not make 
any distinction on the basis of nationality. Nevertheless, the law of alien protection 
meant that a state did not have unlimited right of action when it came to foreigners 
in its territory; the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, on this account, was only 
over its own nationals.53 The state’s right to suppress rebellion as it saw fit gave 
 
 46 See, eg, John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to Which 
the United States Has Been a Party (Government Printing Office, 1898) vol 3, 2972, citing 
Memorial of Mary Hughes, Administratrix of George Hughes (Opinion of Commissioners 
Evans, Smith, and Paine, 18 February 1850).  
 47 This wording was used, for example, in the jurisdictional clause of the 1868 treaty establishing 
a Mexico–US mixed claims commission following the War of the Reform and French 
occupation: Claims Convention between Mexico and the United States, 137 ConTS 331 
(signed and entered into force 4 July 1868) art 1 (‘Mexico–US Convention’). See also Stuyt 
(n 37) 85. 
 48 For some of the earliest cases involving military supplies made to the Mexican revolutionaries 
during the war of independence against Spain, see John Bassett Moore (n 46) vol 4, 3426–8.  
 49 Borchard (n 25) 281.  
 50 Regarding the former, see John Bassett Moore (n 46) vol 2, 1244. Regarding the latter, see 
Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (n 25) 404–5.  
 51 Protocol between Great Britain and Venezuela for the Settlement of British Claims, 192 
ConTS 414 (signed and entered into force 13 February 1903) art III (‘Britain–Venezuela 
Protocol’); Protocol between Germany and Washington for the Arbitration of German 
Claims, 192 ConTS 411 (signed and entered into force 13 February 1903) art III; Protocol 
between Italy and Venezuela for the Settlement of Italian Claims, 192 ConTS 418 (signed and 
entered into force 13 February 2018) art IV. These protocols are reproduced in Jackson H 
Ralston, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903 (Government Printing Office, 1904) 292, 512, 644.  
 52 See, eg, Treaty of Washington (n 37) art XII, which dealt with civil war claims between Britain 
and the US ‘on the part of corporations, companies, or private individuals’. The 1868 
Mexico–US commission also heard claims ‘on the part of corporations, companies, or private 
individuals, citizens’: John Bassett Moore (n 46) vol 2, 1292, quoting Mexico–US Convention 
(n 47) art I. The Britain–Venezuela Protocol refers to claims by British subjects, including 
the railway companies: Britain–Venezuela Protocol (n 51) art III. Regarding corporate claims 
before the Mexican commissions of the 1920s, see Feller (n 38) 112–22.  
 53 See, eg, Norman J Padelford, ‘International Law and the Spanish Civil War’ (1937) 31(2) 
American Journal of International Law 226, 228.  
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way to its obligations in respect of aliens. These obligations were not, however, 
primarily humanitarian in aim; rather, they sought to insulate commercial interests 
against revolution and civil war in the decolonised world. 
B The Doctrine of Belligerency 
Before Common Article 3, the doctrine of belligerency applied the laws of war 
to revolution and civil war. As the 1878 English edition of Henry Wheaton’s 
Elements of International Law noted: 
It seems to be now settled that it is unnecessary in order to constitute a war, that 
both parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States. A 
war may exist where one of the belligerents claims sovereign rights as against the 
other. Whether the struggle is a war, or is not, is to be determined, not from the 
relation of the combatants to each other, but from the mode in which it is carried 
on.54 
Thus, although the laws of war generally only applied to interstate wars,55 a 
recognition of belligerency could put a civil war on the same legal footing as a war 
between states and admit an insurgent group to a certain international legal status 
for the purposes of the hostilities. The exact configuration of the legal results of a 
recognition of belligerency varied depending on whether it was the parent state or 
a third state who did the recognising. However, the basic consequences were, for 
the parent state, that the laws of war applied between the parties, giving them 
belligerent rights and duties, and that the parent was released from responsibility 
for the acts of the insurgents for the purposes of alien protection. Third party states, 
upon recognition, were afforded the rights and duties of neutrality.56 
There was a humanitarian aspect to a recognition of belligerency, at least by the 
parent state,57 in terms of rebels being afforded belligerent rights and thus 
entitlement to prisoner of war status. As William Edward Hall put it in his 
influential 1895 treatise,  
it would be inhuman for the enemy to execute his prisoners; it would be still more 
inhuman for foreign states to capture and hang the crews of war-ships as pirates; 
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humanity requires that the members of [an insurgent community that resembles a 
state] shall be treated as belligerents.58  
However, for Hall, this was a matter of morality rather than international law.59 
The application of the laws of war between the parties also brought into effect 
those humanitarian limitations on the waging of war that existed at that time, such 
as the prohibition on the bombardment of undefended towns.60 This was not, 
however, a factor legally relevant to the decision to recognise belligerency.61 It 
was relations — generally commercial — with third party states that were at the 
core of the doctrine of recognition of belligerency,62 rather than concerns about 
the impact of how the war was being conducted on combatants or populations.63 
Parent state recognition was, anyway, relatively uncontroversial64 and could be 
inferred.65 It was third state recognition that was the issue.66 
When the conditions for belligerency were met, this conferred a right, but not 
a duty, on third states to recognise.67 The doctrine of recognition of belligerency 
was about enabling states to protect their interests when they were affected by a 
civil war. There were different accounts of what the conditions for the existence 
of a state of belligerency were.68 However, fundamentally, they were all concerned 
with the intensity of the conflict (understood in different ways) reaching a certain 
threshold so as to impact third party states or the parent state’s relations with 
them.69 Although the existence of a state of belligerency was commonly 
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considered to be a matter of fact,70 a number of scholars stressed that the right to 
recognise only arose where this was necessary for the recognising state to protect 
its interests.71 For the Marquis of Olivart, who authored the first monograph on 
recognition of belligerency in 1895,72 even where the conditions for the existence 
of a state of belligerency were met, ‘not only is [recognition] not compulsory, but 
it is not even legal, unless [the right of] self-defence and [that of] life itself require 
it’.73 
Primarily, there were two situations that could give rise to the necessity of 
recognition for third states: where the civil war took place in a neighbouring state 
and where the civil war took on a maritime aspect. The second was the most 
important. It was where civil wars were conducted at sea, as well as on land, that 
a recognition of belligerency was likely to be necessary.74 This was because of the 
inevitable impact that maritime war had on commerce.75 Herbert Arthur Smith, in 
his review of British international law practice, argued that Britain recognised 
belligerency, first of all, where the legitimate government claimed the right to 
interfere with neutral commerce.76 The second situation was where Britain needed 
to establish relations with an insurgent government in order to protect its 
nationals.77 As Richard Dana’s well-known note to Wheaton put it, ‘[t]he tests to 
determine the question [of belligerency] are … far more decisive where there is 
maritime war and commercial relations with foreigners’.78 
A recognition of belligerency offered neutral states protection against the 
exercise of certain war powers that belligerents inevitably used against each other 
at sea, particularly those of blockade, visit and search, and capture. As Hall 
explained, ‘these means … are only acquiesced in … under limitations and 
safeguards which, being prescribed by international law with reference only to 
war, could not be insisted upon during the continuance of nominal peace’.79 
Without a recognition of belligerency, the exercise of these powers would lead to 
‘[i]nevitable collisions … which would not improbably drag neutral nations into 
the conflict’.80 The development of rights and duties for neutrals during war was 
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necessary to balance the desire of belligerents to interfere with their adversaries’ 
commerce and the desire of neutral states to maintain freedom of trade.81 
At the core of the rules whose application was triggered by a recognition of 
belligerency was prize law.82 While prize law gave belligerents the right to visit 
and search enemy and neutral vessels and to capture enemy vessels or cargo,83 
neutral vessels and goods were generally exempt from capture,84 the right of visit 
and search was strictly regulated,85 and there was a right to compensation for 
unnecessary interference or wrongful capture.86 Neutrals were allowed to trade 
with belligerents to the extent that such trade did not directly assist the war effort,87 
while belligerents had the right to prevent neutrals from supplying war materials 
to the enemy or trading at all within blockaded areas.88 
The classic example of the operation of this doctrine is the US Civil War.89 
Britain and France recognised the Confederate states as belligerents by declaring 
a policy of neutrality, after Abraham Lincoln declared a blockade of Confederate 
ports and Jefferson Davis issued letters of marque to Confederate privateers.90 The 
declaration of neutrality sought to protect shipping from these hostilities at sea. 
The British declaration forbade its citizens from enlisting; fitting out, equipping 
or arming any ship of war; breaking the blockade; or carrying contraband.91 While 
the British declaration was made by the Queen,92 a Prussian proclamation, taking 
the side of the Union, was made by the Minister of Commerce.93 When it came to 
parent state recognition, this was inferred. The US government treated the rebels 
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Yearbook of International Law 283.  
 87 Tiverton (n 83) 7.  
 88 Ibid.  
 89 See, eg, Azarova and Blum, ‘Belligerency’ (n 82) [11].  
 90 See Sam Foster Halabi, ‘Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in 
Historical and Theoretical Context’ (2012) 27(2) American University International Law 
Review 321, 342–4.  
 91 ‘British Proclamation, for the Observance of Neutrality in the Contest between The United 
States and the Confederate States of America. — London, May 13, 1861’ (1861) 51 British 
and Foreign State Papers 165, 169.  
 92 Ibid 165.  
 93 Letter from Mr Wright to Mr Seward, 25 June 1861, reproduced in ‘Correspondence between 
the United States and Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, France, Hawaiian Islands, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Russia and Spain, Respecting the Civil War in America; the 
Non-Recognition of the So-Called Confederate States; Maritime Rights in Time of War; 
Privateering; and Neutral Trade. — 1861’ (1861) 51 British and Foreign State Papers 67, 67.  
2020] Common Article 3 at 70 13 
Advance Copy 
as belligerents,94 according them belligerent rights, such as prisoner of war 
status,95 and exercising belligerent rights against them, for example, by calling the 
blockade.96 The Confederate government was given de facto recognition for 
commercial reasons; purchases of property and contracts done by the Confederate 
authorities were subsequently enforced by the US Supreme Court.97 
If the US Civil War was the classic example of recognition of belligerency in 
operation, the Spanish Civil War has come to be seen as the epitome of its 
failings.98 The withholding of recognition, particularly by Britain and France, 
during the Spanish conflict is often presented as marking the fall of the doctrine 
after its rise during the 19th century.99 As a result of what happened regarding 
Spain, the doctrine of belligerency was perceived as giving states too much 
discretion, as policy rather than law.100 This, of course, had been the purpose of 
the doctrine originally: to give states — in the context of the expansion of 
capitalism during the 19th century — the power to protect their commercial 
interests when they were affected by civil war or revolution. However, it could not 
necessarily address what was to be a central aspect of the changing context for 
international law’s engagement with civil war post-Second World War: civil wars 
became arenas for larger geopolitical and ideological struggles, a shift that became 
evident with the Spanish Civil War.101 
III COMMON ARTICLE 3: A SHIFT TO HUMANITARIANISM? 
By seeking to apply rules of international law to revolution and civil war, 
Common Article 3 was not, then, treading on new ground, since alien protection 
and the doctrine of belligerency had already done this. The most obvious thing that 
was new about Common Article 3 was that it was a multilateral treaty provision 
that explicitly regulated revolution and civil war. This was a first. Before, there 
had only been bilateral treaties — such as treaties of friendship, commerce and 
navigation that applied to the treatment of foreigners in the event of revolution or 
civil war or that set up mixed claims commissions to adjudicate alien protection 
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claims — and customary international law that was applied on an ad hoc basis. 
This move from ‘ad hoc’ regulation by custom or bilateral treaty to ‘systematic’ 
regulation by multilateral treaty, as Sandesh Sivakumaran has termed it, is not in 
itself a revolutionary or heretical development.102 What was significant about 
Common Article 3, I suggest, was that it reframed revolution and civil war as a 
humanitarian problem rather than a commercial one, even if this did not 
immediately have a significant impact on international law. 
Initially, the biggest impact of Common Article 3 was in giving existing ICRC 
practice a legal basis, rather than in creating new normative obligations for states 
(or rebels).103 This had indeed been the original motivation of the ICRC in 
proposing in 1946 that parties to internal conflict be invited to expressly declare 
their willingness to apply the principles of the Geneva Conventions, beginning the 
process that led to the adoption of Common Article 3.104 After the Second World 
War, the ICRC’s future was uncertain, not least because it had been heavily 
criticised for its response to the Holocaust.105 The role it took in the drafting and 
negotiation of the Geneva Conventions and its work in civil wars were part of its 
response to this challenge, as it sought to restore its reputation and legitimacy as 
an institution.106 Thus, in the first years of Common Article 3’s life, the ICRC was 
busy.107 According to Dietrich Schindler, the ICRC had coined the term 
‘humanitarian law’ in the early 1950s, following the adoption of the Geneva 
Conventions.108 The ICRC’s new humanitarian law did not, however, replace the 
traditional approach to revolution and civil war centred on the doctrine of 
belligerency and the rules of neutrality.109 As Amanda Alexander has shown, 
instead, humanitarian law became a ‘peripheral’ strand of the laws of war.110 The 
 
 102 Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (n 14) chs 1–2.  
 103 See David P Forsythe, ‘Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on 
Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (1978) 72(2) American Journal of International Law 
272, 275–6 (‘Legal Management of Internal War’). Here I am drawing on Anne Orford’s 
argument regarding the responsibility to protect: see Anne Orford, International Authority 
and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
 104 David A Elder, ‘The Historical Background of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 
of 1949’ (1979) 11(1) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 37, 41–2; Jean S 
Pictet (ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1952–59) vol 1, 41 (‘The Geneva Conventions’).  
 105 David P Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) 52. 
 106 Ibid 54–62.  
 107 See International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Humanitarian Aid to the Victims of Internal 
Conflicts: Meeting of a Commission of Experts in Geneva’ (1963) 3(23) International Review 
of the Red Cross 79, 79.  
 108 Dietrich Schindler, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the Laws’ 
(1982) 31(4) American University Law Review 935, 935.  
 109 This is exemplified, for example, by Erik Castrén, Civil War (Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 
1966).  
 110 Amanda Alexander, ‘A Short History of International Humanitarian Law’ (2015) 26(1) 
European Journal of International Law 109, 117 (‘A Short History’). Alexander particularly 
notes the work of Jean Pictet in the 1960s: at 116–18, citing Jean S Pictet, ‘The Development 
of International Humanitarian Law’ in C Wilfred Jenks et al (eds), International Law in a 
Changing World (Oceana Publications, 1963) 114; J Pictet, ‘The Principles of International 
Humanitarian Law’ (1966) 6(66) International Review of the Red Cross 455.  
2020] Common Article 3 at 70 15 
Advance Copy 
ICRC’s initial push during the 1950s for greater regulation of internal conflict in 
the interests of humanitarianism failed.111 
In the decade that followed the adoption of Common Article 3, there was 
relatively little international law scholarship about it, or about civil war and 
revolution more generally.112 Initially, the main concern about civil war was 
intervention in the context of the Cold War and decolonisation.113 Morris 
Greenspan wrote in 1959 that international law was increasingly interested in the 
problem of civil and colonial war because ‘experience has demonstrated, 
especially in recent years, that such wars may gravely threaten international peace 
and security, and may contain the seeds of international conflict of calamitous 
dimensions’.114 Greenspan was forgetting that, in the past, international law had 
been interested in civil war for other, not so different, reasons. Civil war was no 
longer being framed as a commercial problem — although the emerging body of 
international investment law would continue to deal with this aspect of civil 
war.115 There was nevertheless a certain continuity of concern with the doctrine 
of belligerency approach in two ways. First, in the sense that focus remained on 
the rights and duties of third states: the question was how to regulate foreign 
intervention in the new nuclear Cold War age. Second, in terms of the continued 
centrality of the status of rebels and the conflicts in which they fought: it was a 
matter of whether national liberation movements were belligerents and 
anticolonial struggles were international wars. 
With the US and the Soviet Union generally avoiding direct confrontation 
during the Cold War, in the decades following the Second World War, civil wars 
were ‘converted … into the major testing ground of rival ideologies, capabilities, 
and commitments … [and] assumed a symbolic role in the geopolitics of the 
nuclear age’.116 The issue of when and to what extent foreign states could 
intervene in civil wars and revolutions was a central question of international order 
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for international lawyers,117 who sought to develop the rules of international law 
to meet the challenges of modern ‘revolutionary and interventionary violence’.118 
This reached a peak during the height of US involvement in Vietnam during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.119 Alongside intervention, anticolonial wars raised 
other international legal questions. The Algerian War (1954–62), for example, was 
fought primarily around questions of status.120 For the National Liberation Front 
(‘FLN’) in Algeria, the goal was to establish themselves as a legitimate belligerent 
and the conflict as a true state of belligerency.121 This not only meant that their 
fighters would get the full protections of the laws of war, particularly prisoner of 
war status (Common Article 3, of course, only protected persons taking no active 
part in the hostilities).122 It was also a means of legitimising the Algerian cause 
and discrediting the French,123 who had denied that there was a conflict in Algeria, 
be it international or non-international, and argued that they were simply carrying 
out an ‘operation of pacification’ and could exercise emergency ‘police’ powers 
unrestrained by international standards.124 
There was, of course, humanitarian concern about the conduct of the hostilities 
and the inhumane treatment of prisoners and civilians during proxy and 
anticolonial wars such as those in Vietnam and Algeria.125 However, this was just 
one aspect of the problem that civil war and revolution posed for international law 
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alongside, or quite often behind, issues of intervention and recognition.126 In 1971, 
Falk wrote of the traditional approach’s ‘partial decay’.127 By the 1970s, it was 
being widely criticised for its inability to regulate civil wars as proxy wars in a 
global ideological and geopolitical struggle.128 The solution offered by the 19th 
century doctrine of belligerency was rejected. Nevertheless, the framing of the 
problem — as one mainly concerning the rights and duties of third states and the 
status of rebels and internal conflicts — was still relevant. 
However, in the late 1960s, the ICRC’s efforts to promote further humanitarian 
regulation of armed conflict — including revolution and civil war — began to have 
more purchase. It was the rise of the human rights movement that gave the ICRC 
its opening.129 The turning point was the 1968 International Conference on Human 
Rights in Tehran (‘Tehran Conference’),130 which adopted a resolution requesting 
the consideration of 
additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible revision of 
existing Conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners and 
combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of 
certain methods and means of warfare …131 
In 1971, the ICRC convened its Conference of Government Experts on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in 
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Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1987) 1319, 1326–7 [4371]. See also Alexander, ‘A Short History’ (n 110) 119.  
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Armed Conflicts (‘Conference of Government Experts’).132 For Alexander, this 
marked the emergence of international humanitarian law as a field of international 
law, which would replace the laws of war133 and the traditional approach to civil 
war and revolution. This new international humanitarian law was to go far beyond 
Common Article 3 when it came to revolution and civil war, covering protections 
for combatants and the regulation of the conduct of hostilities. 
However, at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development 
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts held in Geneva 
between 1974 and 1977 (‘1974–77 Diplomatic Conference’), states had their own 
agendas, independent of that of the ICRC.134 Following Algeria, the struggle for 
the states of the decolonised world was to give certain conflicts, particularly wars 
of national liberation, international status: that is, to have them recognised as 
situations of belligerency on a par with interstate wars.135 This was successful with 
the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (‘Additional 
Protocol I’), even if many states initially refused to sign or ratify it.136 However, 
the states of the decolonised world objected to greater humanitarian protections in 
other sorts of internal conflict, fearing that they would undermine postcolonial 
statehood by encouraging intervention from without and rebellion within (as per 
Vietnam, Katanga or Biafra).137 For Jessica Whyte, the 1974–77 Diplomatic 
Conference pitted Third World mobilisation of the language of just war in the 
interests of self-determination and anti-imperialism against the supposedly 
apolitical humanitarianism espoused by Western delegates.138 As a result of 
objections from decolonised states, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (‘Additional Protocol II’) eventually ended up 
very limited, stripped of a lot of content in order to reach a consensus.139 
Nevertheless, Additional Protocol II introduced ‘innovative’ protection for 
civilians during internal conflict.140 Despite their limitations, the adoption of 
Additional Protocols I and II marked the predomination of the new humanitarian 
conception of revolution and civil war. 
The internationalisation of civil wars and revolutions ‘in which peoples are 
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’ in Additional 
 
 132 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Conference of Government Experts on the 
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Protocol I141 only reinforced the distinction between international conflict and 
conflict not of an international character that had been established by Common 
Article 3. Those conflicts that had been left out of Additional Protocol I had never 
been less international, especially those that did not even meet Additional Protocol 
II’s high threshold for application.142 They were much more peripheral to the new 
field of international humanitarian law than they ever had been under the pre-
Second World War regulation of revolution and civil war through alien protection 
and the doctrine of belligerency. After Additional Protocol II, the task for the 
emerging body of international humanitarian lawyers was to bring them back in. 
The way to do it, as I shall discuss in the next section, was through the practice of 
international organisations and NGOs, particularly in the area of human rights. 
By the turn of the 1980s, the doctrine of belligerency was entirely discredited; 
the traditional laws of war had been replaced by the new international 
humanitarian law.143 Alien protection had split into international human rights law 
and international investment law. To the extent that alien protection was about 
protecting foreign commercial interests, it was separated off into the latter as a 
new specialist regime. To the extent that alien protection addressed issues such as 
deprivation of liberty and inhumane treatment, it has been absorbed into and 
exceeded by international human rights law, which also covers nationals too.144 
Now that the US had pulled out of Vietnam and most colonies had achieved 
independence, it was less clear which causes, if any, would emerge that had the 
same widespread moral purchase. As the limits of postcolonial sovereignty were 
becoming evident and faith in revolutionary nationalism was on the wane, 
humanitarianism and human rights — with their apparently apolitical and neutral 
focus on victims — began to take over as frameworks for understanding revolution 
and civil war.145 
IV COMMON ARTICLE 3 AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF REBELS AND INSURGENTS 
At the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International 
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, held in Geneva between 21 April 
and 12 August 1949 (‘1949 Diplomatic Conference’), doubt was expressed about 
how a non-state party that did not yet exist could be bound by a treaty to which it 
was not a signatory. The ICRC’s initial drafts of what became Common Article 3 
were based on reciprocity.146 For some, reciprocity was the only mechanism by 
which to circumvent the fact that rebels, as non-signatories lacking international 
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legal personality, could not be bound by the Geneva Conventions.147 In the end, 
the draft conventions approved at the 17th International Red Cross Conference 
convened in Stockholm in 1948 (‘Stockholm Drafts’)148 — which became the 
basis for discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference — included a reciprocity 
clause in the draft third and fourth Conventions but not in the first and second.149 
The Greek delegate explained that this was because it was not considered 
appropriate in matters of a purely humanitarian nature, such as the treatment of the 
wounded and sick, for one party’s obligations to depend on the observance of the 
same by the other party, whereas prisoners of war were a different matter.150 The 
ICRC had already abandoned reciprocity by this point. It argued that the 
‘minimum satisfaction of humanitarian demands, apart from any question of 
reciprocity’, remained the same in civil war as in international conflict and that a 
reciprocity clause may ‘completely stultify’ Common Article 3’s application since 
‘[o]ne of the parties to the conflict could always assert, as would be all too easy in 
a war of this nature, that the adversary was not observing such and such a provision 
of the Convention’.151 
The relevant provisions of the Stockholm Drafts provided, primarily, that ‘each 
of the Parties to the conflict’ or ‘each of the adversaries’ were bound to apply the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions in situations of armed conflict not of an 
international character in the territory of the one of the contracting parties.152 
During the debates at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, some states objected to the 
‘each Party to the conflict’ wording,153 on the basis that the non-state party could 
not be bound by a convention to which it was not a signatory.154 In contrast, the 
French delegation argued that Common Article 3 would bind rebels on the basis 
of the obligation on each state party to ensure respect for the Conventions in all 
circumstances under Common Article 1.155 The delegate from Monaco explained: 
[T]he rebels might be regarded as already bound by the Convention … because the 
Contracting Parties undertake not only to respect them, but to ensure respect for 
them, an article providing for their dissemination among the population through 
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instruction. Therefore, the rebels are a part of the population in revolt of the 
Contracting State.156 
The Greek delegate added two further reasons. First, that the Geneva 
Conventions were ‘law making Conventions … which should be applicable not 
only on behalf of or against the Contracting Parties, but also in circumstances 
which were analogous to those governed by the said Conventions’.157 Second, that 
rebels would be bound by the obligations of the state of which they were nationals 
and, presuming that their home state was a signatory, they would thus be bound 
by the Conventions.158 In the end, the final text refers to ‘each Party to the conflict’ 
being bound,159 although now not by the entire Conventions but by some core 
humanitarian principles. According to Frédéric Siordet of the ICRC, there was ‘a 
clear majority who considered that both parties should be bound in case of 
domestic conflict’.160 
Nevertheless, some delegations remained unconvinced. The Swiss delegate 
described Common Article 3 as a ‘code of the obligations assumed by the 
Contracting States in the event of non-international conflicts’.161 The delegate 
from Burma objected forcefully: 
[R]eciprocity … [is an] insoluble difficulty … The adverse party should, in all 
reason and sense of justice, be made to comply with the unqualified provisions laid 
down for the observance of the High Contracting Party … [T]he text … proposed 
an impossible condition: to bind down a non-contracting party … [T]he Article says 
that ‘each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply’ etc. May I ask how it is 
proposed to bind the rebels? … In Article 2, the application of the Conventions in 
conflicts of an international character, the High Contracting Party has to apply the 
provisions only when a non-signatory party accepts and complies with its 
provisions. In this Article in a conflict not of an international character — in the 
dealings with insurgents — the High Contracting Party is bound to apply the 
provisions whether the insurgents accept and observe them or not.162 
Its drafting history would suggest that Common Article 3, rather than 
representing the foundations of a consensus regarding the imposition of 
obligations on rebels, confirms Philip Allott’s famous assertion that ‘[a] treaty is 
a disagreement reduced to writing’.163 As Siordet noted in 1950, ‘[d]oubt has been 
repeatedly expressed … that Article 3 could be binding on a rebel party that is not 
yet in existence’.164 
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Despite dissent,165 that Common Article 3 nevertheless bound rebels did not 
cause too much controversy in the decades that followed, even if the problem of 
how was never satisfactorily resolved. For some, the proposition that Common 
Article 3 imposed obligations on rebels with its reference to the ‘parties to the 
conflict’ was ‘too obvious to require any other explanation’.166 A number of 
theories circulated as to how Common Article 3 bound rebels, on top of those 
discussed at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. The ICRC commentaries to the 
Geneva Conventions posited that ‘if the responsible authority at their head 
exercises effective sovereignty, [the insurgent party] is bound by the very fact that 
it claims to represent the country, or part of the country’.167 Others argued that 
rebels were bound as a result of the principle of effectiveness;168 that ‘[w]hen 
individuals group themselves in a particular way so that they become a party to an 
internal conflict, then they are given collectively a sufficient legal personality to 
enable them to be subject to obligations’;169 or that Common Article 3 restated 
existing international law.170 None of these theories managed to resolve the issue 
definitively, however, and indeed, they continue to be argued about.171 
So why were the obligations of rebels under Common Article 3 nevertheless 
relatively uncontroversial? I argue that this was because imposing obligations on 
rebels was not an important goal of Common Article 3 at that time.172 Rather, 
Common Article 3 was aimed at protecting civilians under occupation; its 
promoters had the acts of the Nazis in mind.173 Thus, it was state conduct that was 
the concern.174 In any event, it was envisioned that rebel groups would not deny 
their obligations under Common Article 3 on the basis of legal technicalities. Even 
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if Common Article 3 was not strictly legally binding on rebels, this was not 
perceived as an important problem. As the ICRC’s commentaries to the 
Conventions put it: ‘If an insurgent party applies Article 3, so much the better for 
the victims of the conflict. No one will complain. If it does not apply it, it will 
prove that those who regard its actions as mere acts of anarchy or brigandage are 
right.’175 
The events of the Algerian War appeared to bear out this approach. In Algeria, 
it was the FLN that wanted Common Article 3 to apply to the Algerian conflict 
and sought a special agreement with France regarding the broader application of 
the Geneva Conventions.176 The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic 
even acceded to the Conventions in 1960.177 As I noted above, this was not only 
about seeking protection for their combatants but also about legitimising their 
cause in the eyes of the world, just as it was predicted rebels would behave.178 
Meanwhile, the French government initially tried to deny that it was bound by 
Common Article 3 in Algeria (although France eventually implicitly accepted its 
application).179 At the same time, the main concern was the French use of torture, 
rather than the conduct of the rebels.180 
However, in 1965, the Viet Cong denied that the Geneva Conventions applied 
to it, declaring itself ‘not bound by the international treaties to which others beside 
itself subscribed’.181 This scenario, which had not been anticipated, had now 
become a reality.182 Gradually, the question of Common Article 3’s imposition of 
obligations on rebels became more controversial. As Katharine Fortin has argued, 
‘the idea that armed groups can be bound by treaty law was more controversial in 
the 1970s, than at the end of the 1940s when the Geneva Conventions were 
drafted’.183 Doubts were repeatedly expressed about the possibility of binding 
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rebels by treaty at the Conference of Government Experts and at the 1974–77 
Diplomatic Conference.184 
The original draft version of Additional Protocol II proposed by the ICRC 
imposed obligations on the ‘parties to the conflict’ as per Common Article 3 and 
contained an article providing that ‘[t]he rights and duties of the parties to the 
conflict under the present Protocol are equally valid for all of them’.185 The ICRC 
explained: 
The experts several times voiced their concern that the insurgent party might only 
be lightly bound by the Protocol, and the view was expressed that it would be 
desirable to make an attempt to strengthen its obligations. In this regard, the present 
draft follows a technique similar to the one adopted in common Article 3: an 
engagement entered into by the State is not only binding upon the government but 
also upon the constituted authorities and the private individuals who are on the 
national territory, upon whom certain obligations are thus imposed …186 
In the end, however, this provision was deleted, as were all references to the 
parties to the conflict; the obligations in Additional Protocol II are expressed in 
the passive voice, silent as to who bears them. This takes us back to the concern 
of the decolonised states regarding Additional Protocol II.187 Those states objected 
to the explicit imposition of international legal obligations on rebels on the basis 
that it would put the rebels on an equal footing with governments and legitimise 
and encourage rebellion.188 The ‘remarkable’ agreement189 that was reached in 
1949 could not be repeated in 1977. 
However, at the beginning of the 1980s, human rights groups began monitoring 
rebel compliance with international humanitarian law, particularly in the context 
of Central America. Americas Watch, for example — now part of Human Rights 
Watch — was, according to its official history, ‘founded in 1981 while bloody 
civil wars engulfed Central America. Relying on extensive on-the-ground 
fact-finding, Americas Watch … applied international humanitarian law to 
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investigate and expose war crimes by rebel groups.’190 Throughout the 1980s, 
Americas Watch published numerous reports detailing rebels’ responsibility for 
civilian casualties and assessing their conduct of hostilities in conflicts in, among 
others, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru.191 In 1990, the 
Commission on Human Rights requested its monitoring mechanisms ‘to pay 
particular attention to the activities of irregular armed groups’ in their reports,192 
while around the same time, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(‘IACHR’) also started to consider the conduct of rebels in its annual and country-
specific reports.193 The United Nations Security Council too began to engage with 
rebels, calling on them to comply with international humanitarian and human 
rights law194 and even applying sanctions for non-compliance.195 From these 
beginnings in the 1980s and early 1990s, a vast body of practice has emerged.196 
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A field of scholarship on rebels and their obligations, compliance and 
accountability followed,197 and continues to expand.198 As Andrew Clapham 
argued in 2014: 
[T]he need to address the international obligations of these groups [armed non-state 
actors] has become self-evident, especially for those involved in humanitarian 
protection work. The legal landscape is being reshaped by the recent practices of 
some parts of the United Nations and certain non-governmental organizations …199 
So, while Common Article 3 can be seen as the origin of the imposition of 
humanitarian obligations on rebels, it was not until much later that this was taken 
up, driven by the practice of international organisations and NGOs, particularly in 
the area of human rights. It was this practice that brought rebels — and indeed 
revolution and civil war — back into international law to the extent that they had 
been marginalised after the Additional Protocols. Now, however, they were 
framed in a different form than they had been until the early 1970s. They were a 
humanitarian problem for individuals, rather than a commercial problem or a 
problem of intervention or recognition for third states. At the same time, and 
somewhat under the radar, international investment law has continued to protect 
commercial interests against revolution and civil war, one of the effects of 
fragmentation.200 
V CONCLUSION 
Common Article 3 was not revolutionary or heretical merely because it applied 
international law to civil war and revolution or imposed international obligations 
on rebels. The law of alien protection and the doctrine of belligerency already did 
this. It was certainly the first multilateral treaty to do so, but such a change in form 
is not, I argued, revolutionary or heretical in itself. What was groundbreaking 
about Common Article 3 was that it applied international law to civil war and 
revolution and imposed international obligations on rebels within a new framing 
of internal conflict as a humanitarian — rather than as a primarily commercial — 
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problem. It took many decades, however, and the rise of international human rights 
law for this framing to come to predominate and for international lawyers to take 
a serious interest in the obligations of rebels. Thus, international law has long been 
concerned about revolution and civil war, but it is the nature of this concern that 
has changed. At the same time, it was Common Article 3 that established — rather 
than overcame — the distinction between international and non-international 
conflict, a distinction that was consolidated by the Additional Protocols in which 
the internationalisation of certain civil wars and revolutions only deepened the 
marginalisation of others. Those conflicts that had been left out of Additional 
Protocol I had never been less international, a marginalisation that was only later 
overcome by the subsequent practice of first NGOs and then international 
organisations, particularly in the area of human rights. 
